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Introduction
The RSA public-key cryptosystem, invented in 1978 by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [15] , is one of the most popular systems in use today. In the RSA cryptosystem, the public key is (N, e) where the modulus N = pq is a product of two primes of the same bitsize, and the public exponent is a positive integer satisfying ed ≡ 1 (mod φ(N )). In RSA, encryption and decryption require executing heavy exponential multiplications modulo the large integer N . To reduce the decryption time, one may be tempted to use a small private exponent d. However, in 1990 Wiener [18] showed that RSA is insecure if d < Concurrent to these efforts, many RSA variants have been proposed in order to ensure computational efficiency while maintaining the acceptable levels of security. One such important variant is the Prime Power RSA. In Prime Power RSA the modulus N is in the form N = p r q for r ≥ 2. In [17] , Takagi showed how to use the Prime Power RSA to speed up the decryption process when the public and private exponents satisfy an equation ed ≡ 1 (mod (p − 1)(q − 1)). As in the standard RSA cryptosystem, the security of the Prime Power RSA depends on the difficulty of factoring integers of the form N = p r q.
Therefore, a Prime Power RSA modulus must be appropriately chosen, since it has to resist factoring algorithms such as the Number Field Sieve [10] and the Elliptic Curve Method [9] . Table 1 , shows the suggested secure Power RSA forms as a function of the size of the modulus back in 2002 (see [4] ). Note that, due to the ever increasing development of computing hardware, the form N = p 2 q is no longer recommended for 1024 bit modulus. In 1999, Boneh, Durfee, and Howgrave-Graham [3] presented a method for factoring N = p r q when r is large. Furthermore, Takagi [17] proved that one can factor N if d < N and gave explicit bounds for r = 3, 4, 5.
In this paper, we focus on the Prime Power RSA with a modulus N = p r q, and present three new attacks: In the first attack we consider a public exponent e satisfying an equation ex − φ(N )y = z where x and y are positive integers. Using a recent result of Lu, Zhang and Lin [12] , we show that one can factor N in polynomial time if |xz| < N r(r−1) (r+1) 2 . In the standard situation z = 1, the condition becomes d = x < N r(r−1) (r+1) 2 which improves the bound of May [13] for r ≥ 3 and retrieves the bound of Lu, Zhang and Lin [12] . Note that unlike Sarkar [16] who solves ex − φ(N )y = 1, we solve a more general equation ex − φ(N )y = z. This leads to less constraints on the solution space, which in turn leads to an increase in the number of solutions to the equation. Intuitively speaking, our method has higher likelihood of finding solutions; that is, factoring RSA. In section 3, we shall present an example supporting this claim.
In the second attack, we consider an instance of the Prime Power RSA with modulus N = p r q. We show that one can factor N if two private keys d 1 and d 2 share an amount of their most significant bits, that is if
More precisely, we show that if |d 1 − d 2 | < N r(r−1) (r+1) 2 , then N can be factored in polynomial time. The method we present is based on a recent result of [12] with Coppersmith's method for solving an univariate linear equation.
In the third attack, we consider two instances of the Prime Power RSA with two moduli N 1 = p r 1 q 1 and N 2 = p r 2 q 2 such that the prime factors p 1 and p 2 share an amount of their most significant bits, that is |p 1 − p 2 | is small. More precisely, we show that one can factor the RSA moduli N 1 and N 2 in polynomial time if
2rq1q2 . The method we use for this attack is based on the continued fraction algorithm.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we briefly review the preliminaries necessary for the attacks, namely Coppersmith's technique for solving linear equations and the continued fractions theorem. In Section 3, we present the first attack on the Prime Power RSA, which is valid with no conditions on the prime factors. In Section 4, we present the second attack in the situation where two decryption exponents share an amount of their most significant bits. In Section 5, we present the third attack on the Prime Power RSA when the prime factors share an amount of their most significant bits. We then conclude the paper in Section 6.
Preliminaries
In this section, we present some basics on Coppersmith's method for solving linear modular polynomial equations and an overview of the continued fraction algorithm. Both techniques are used in the crafting of our attacks.
First, observe that if N = p r q with q < p, then p r+1 > p r q = N , and p > N 
Linear Modular Polynomial Equations
In 1995, Coppersmith [5] developed powerful lattice-based techniques for solving both modular polynomial diophantine equations with one variable and two variables. These techniques have been generalized to more variables, and have served for cryptanalysis of many instances of RSA. More on this can be found in [14, 8] . In [7] , Herrmann and May presented a method for finding the small roots of a modular polynomial equation f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ≡ 0 (mod p) where f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ Z[x 1 , . . . , x n ] and p is an unknown divisor of a known integer N . Their method is based on the seminal work of Coppersmith [5] . Very recently, Lu, Zhang and Lin [12] presented a generalization for finding the small roots of a modular polynomial equation f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ≡ 0 (mod p v ), where p v is a divisor of some composite integer N . For the bivariate case, they proved the following result, which we shall use in the crafting of our attacks.
Theorem 1 (Lu, Zhang and Lin) . Let N be a composite integer with a divisor p u such that p ≥ N β for some 0 < β ≤ 1. Let f (x, y) ∈ Z[x, y] be a homogenous linear polynomial. Then one can find all the solutions (x, y) of the equation f (x, y) = 0 mod p v with gcd(x, y) = 1, |x| < N γ1 , |y| < N γ2 , in polynomial time if γ 1 + γ 2 < uvβ 2 .
The Continued Fractions Algorithm
We present here the well known result of Legendre on convergents of a continued fraction expansion of a real number. The details can be found in [6] . Let ξ be a positive real number. Define ξ 0 = ξ and for i = 0, 1, . . . , n, a i = ξ i , ξ i+1 = 1/(ξ i − a i ) unless ξ i is an integer. This expands ξ as a continued fraction in the following form: 3 The First Attack on Prime Power RSA with Modulus N = p r q
In this section, we present an attack on the Prime Power RSA when the public key (N, e) satisfies an equation ex − φ(N )y = z with small parameters x and |z|.
Theorem 3. Let N = p r q be a Prime Power RSA modulus and e a public exponent satisfying the equation ex − φ(N )y = z with 1 < e < φ(N ) and gcd(e, φ(N )) = 1. Then one can factor N in polynomial time if In order to solve the diophantine equation ex−φ(N )y = z, we transformed it into the equation ex − z ≡ 0 (mod p r−1 ) using Theorem 3. To be able to apply Coppersmith's technique via Theorem 1, we chose the parameters m = 7, t = 6 so that the dimension of constructed the lattice is 36, and X = N r(r−1) (r+1) 2 = 1592999974064. We built the lattice using the polynomial f (x 1 , x 2 ) = x 1 + ex 2 , then applied the LLL algorithm [11] , and used Gröbner basis method to find the smallest solution x 1 = −11537 and x 2 = 7053 to f (x 1 , x 2 ) ≡ 0 (mod p r−1 ) in 174 seconds using an off-the-shelf computer. From this solution, we deduced p = gcd(x 1 + ex 2 , N ) = 2294269585934949239, and finally recovered q = N p 2 = 1546077175000723901. We then computed φ(N ) and d ≡ e −1 (mod φ(N )) as follows:
98 which is out of range of Sarkar's bound [16] which can only retrieve private keys d < N 0.395 for r = 2.
4 The Second Attack on Prime Power RSA using Two Decryption Exponents
In this section, we present an attack on the Prime Power RSA when two private exponents d 1 and d 2 share an amount of their most significant bits, that is
Theorem 4.
Let N = p r q be an RSA modulus and d 1 and d 2 be two private exponents. Then, one can factor N in polynomial time, if
Proof 1 (mod φ(N )) and e 2 d 2 ≡ 1 (mod φ(N ) ). Multiplying the first equation by e 2 and the second by e 1 and subtracting, we get The polynomial equation is f (x) = e 1 e 2 x − (e 2 − e 1 ) ≡ 0 (mod p r−1 ), which can be transformed into g(x) = x − a ≡ 0 (mod p r−1 ) where a ≡ (e 2 − e1)(e 1 e 2 ) −1
(mod N ). Using m = 8 and t = 6, we built a lattice with dimension ω = 9. Applying the LLL algorithm [11] and solving the first reduced polynomials, we get the solution x 0 = 1826732340. Hence gcd(f (x 0 ), N ) = p = 1789386140116417697 and finally q = N p 2 = 1903010275819064491. The whole process took less than 4 seconds using an off-the-shelf computer. Then, using φ(N ) = p(p − 1)(q − 1), we retrieved the private exponents d 1 ≡ e 
then, one can factor N in polynomial time.
Proof. Suppose that
In order to apply Theorem 2, we need that
, or equivalently
Observe that
, that is if
Under this condition, we get 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered the Prime Power RSA with modulus N = p r q and public exponent e. We presented three new attacks to factor the modulus in polynomial time. The first attack can be applied if small parameters x, y and z satisfying the equation ex − φ(N )y = z can be found . The second attack can be applied when two private exponents d 1 and d 2 share an amount of their most significant bits. The third attack can be applied when two Prime Power RSA moduli N 1 = p r 1 q 1 and N 2 = p r 2 q 2 are such that p 1 and p 2 share an amount of their most significant bits.
